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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHEVRON CHEMICAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff--Appellant,

)
)

vs.
CRAIG W. ME CHAM,
Case No. 14423
Defendant-•Respondent, )
and
R. KENT HEILESON,
Defendant.

J

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
CHEVRON CHEMICAL COMPANY

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal raises the issue whether a Utah resident
who incorporates a business in Idaho for personal profit, and
who personally guarantees the Idaho business account of such
corporation, but who regularly engages in the management of
such corporation only by long-distance communication, is
subject to suit in Idaho upon default on such personally
guaranteed
account.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Seventh District Court of Idaho, Bonneville
County, took jurisdiction of the action and gave judgment
against the Utah resident.

The Third District Court of Utah,

Honorable James Sawaya presiding, dismissed plaintiff-appellantfs action to enforce the Idaho judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The present appeal seeks reversal of the Third
District Court dismissal, and an order that summary judgment
be entered for plaintiff-appellant.

•,..-,'•

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The essential jurisdictional facts were all admitted,
either in the Complaint and Answer, Requests for Admissions
and Answers, or the Deposition of defendant-respondent Mecham
taken September 9, 1975. The admitted jurisidctional facts
are as follows:

In or about 1968, defendant-respondent

Mecham and defendant Heileson, and their fathers, incorporated
Great Basin Grain Company as an Idaho corporation, having its
chief place of business at Tetonia, Idaho.

The intent of

the incorporation was to obtain profits for the incorporators.
The day-to-day management of Great Basin Grain Company was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

given to defendant Heileson.

Defendant-respondent Mecham

ordinarily remained in Utah. Mecham, however, received from
defendant Heileson at least annually, telephone reports on
the conduct of the business and gave his advice as to such
reports.

On at least one occasion, Mecham traveled to Idaho

on business of Great Basin Grain Company.

In or prior to

August, 1968, it was determined by Great Basin Grain Company
to open an account with Chevron Chemical Company for the purchase of various products, chiefly fertilizer. Mecham and
Heileson were informed by Chevron that credit would not be so
extended unless personal guarantees of the account were received by Chevron from incorporators of Great Basin.
guarantee was thereupon given by Mecham and Heileson.

A joint
The form

of guarantee was prepared by Chevron at its Portland, Oregon,
office.

The document was then mailed to Idaho where it was

signed by Heileson, and to Utah, where it was signed by Mecham.
Thereupon, an account was opened pursuant to which Chevron
would deliver products to Great Basin Grain Company at Tetonia,
Idaho, and there receive payment for the same. When Great
Basin defaulted on its account, suit was brought in Idaho on
the guarantee, resulting in the judgment now sought to be
enforced.

Mecham was served in Utah under the Idaho long-arm

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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statute.

Heileson was served in Idaho.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT WAS, DOING BUSINESS IN
* IDAHO BY CORPORATE AGENT/ "^
The Idaho long-arm statute, Idaho Code Section 5-514,
is as follows:
"5-514• Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction
of courts of state.
"Any person, firm, company, association or
corporation, whether or not a citizen or resident
of this state, who in person or through an agent
does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated,
thereby submits said person, firm, company, association or corporation, and if an individual, his
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state as to any cause of action
arising from the doing of any of said acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within
this state which is hereby defined as the
doing of any act for the purpose of realizing
pecuniary benefit or accomplishing or attempting
to accomplish, transact or enhance the business
purpose or objective or any part thereof of such
person, firm, company, association or corporation;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within
this state;
(c) The ownership, use or possession of any
real property situate within this state;
(d) Contracting to insure any person,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

property or risk located within this state
at the time of contracting;
(e) The maintenance within this state of
matrimonial domicile at the time of the
commission of any act giving rise to a cause
of action for divorce or separate maintenance.ff
The case of Salter v. Lawn, 294 F.Supp. 882 (D.C.
Mass. 1968) arose upon facts and under a statute essentially
identical to those involved in the present case.

There defend-

ant, a New Jersey resident, organized a New York corporation to
do business in Massachusetts.

Defendant was to receive 107o of

the profits and remit the remainder to a financial backer.
Defendant went to Massachusetts in connection with the organization and subsequently in connection with the business.

The

corporation became indebted to Massachusetts banks on notes of
the corporation, apparently made in New York and delivered in
Massachusetts.

Defendant personally guaranteed the notes by

endorsing them, apparently also in New York.

When the corpora-

tion went bankrupt, it appeared that defendant had caused corporate funds to be used to pay off the guaranteed notes. The
trustee of the bankrupt sued in Massachusetts, serving defendant
in New Jersey, alleging that such payments were unlawful and
that defendant remained liable on the guarantees.

The U. S.

District Court asserted jurisdiction, denying a motion to quash,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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on the following grounds:
The "Long Arm11 statute, Mass. G.L. c. 223A
§3(a) provides that "... a court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action
arising from the person's ... transacting any
business in this commonwealth." Of course, the
statute is incorporated by reference as appropriate
for service in an action brought in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
On the facts recited, defendant having organized,
used, and controlled the bankrupt corporation with
the sole purpose of carrying out his agreement with
the bishop under which he is to receive 107o and the
bishop 907o of the profits of the nursing homes, it
follows as a matter of law that:
(1) The bankrupt corporation was in all its
business defendant's agent.
(2) Defendant was "a person who acts... by an
agent" as to all causes of action arising from the
bankrupt corporation's "transacting any business in
the commonwealth."
(3) The bankrupt corporation's uses of its
deposits in a Massachusetts bank to pay obligations
due to that bank in Massachusetts were examples of
defendant himself and not merely the bankrupt corporation "transacting... business in this Commonwealth."
The only substantial difference between Salter v. Lawn and the
present case is that Great Basin Grain Company was not only
doing business in Idaho, it was an Idaho corporation.
While cases involving guarantees are not numerous,
there is sufficient agreement among courts which have considered
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the problem to support the statement of a general rule that in
a commercial setting the giving of a guarantee of performance
of a contract is sufficient transaction of business within the
state in which the contract is to be performed to submit the
guarantor to that state's jursidiction under the usual longarm statute.
In State ex. rel. Ware v. Hieber, 515 P.2d 721 (Or.
1973), defendants, California residents, gave a personal
guarantee of the account of a Nevada corporation doing business
in Oregon.

The guarantee was prepared in New York, executed in

California, and returned to New York.
governed by the laws of New York.

It recited that it was

The Oregon Court found

jurisdiction in Oregon over the California defendants.

The

Court said:
If we were to view the Ware's guarantee as a
transaction completely separate from the transaction
between Black Diamond and Keller Enterprises, the
connection between the Wares and Oregon would be
slender. We do not consider it realistic, however,
to consider the guarantee in a vacuumc From the
standpoint of "fairness" to the parties and convenience to the parties and from the standpoint of
the interests of the State of Oregon, we are of the
opinion that the personal guarantee of the Wares must
be considered as one aspect of the entire course of
business between Keller Enterprises and Black Diamond.

In F i r s t - C i t i z e n s Bank & Trust Co. v . McDaniel, 197
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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S.E.2d 556 (N.C. 1973), involving a guarantee of a commercial
loan, the North Carolina Court said:

ff

Where the non-resident

defendant promises to pay the debt of another, which debt is
owed to North Carolina creditors, such promise is a contract to
be performed in North Carolina and is sufficient minimal contract upon which this state may assert personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.!f

-

Two cases involving guarantees have found no jurisdiction over the non-resident guarantor.

These cases are

readily distinguished from the present case, however.

Misco

Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughan, 450 F.2d 257 (10 Cir. 1971), involved a contract signed in Oklahoma for delivery to an Oklahoma business of machinery from Kansas. A guarantee of payment was signed in Oklahoma.

The contracting party and the

guarantor were residents of Oklahoma.

The court found no

jurisdiction in Kansas over the Oklahoma defendants.

Clearly,

however, the case involved guarantee of a contract to be performed in Oklahoma, and had been given to further the activities
of an Oklahoma business.

In D.E.B. Adjustment Co. v. Dillard,

508 P.2d 420 (Colo. 1973), a California resident executed a
note in Colorado for payment of a Colorado debt (for college
room and board).

Subsequently, the debtor's mother executed Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in California a guarantee of her son's note.

The Colorado

Court found that there was Colorado jurisdiction over the son,
but not over the mother.

This case, however, clearly involved

a non-commercial transaction.

Moreover, the mother's guarantee

was given after the son's debt arose.

It was not given to

induce extension of credit to the son, and for that reason was
not in furtherance of his transaction of business in Colorado.
At hearing on cross motions for summary judgment
herein, defendant-respondent cited Ferrante Equipment Co. v.
Lasker-Goldman Corp., 258 N.E.2d 202 (N.Y. 1970), in response
to the foregoing authority.

Ferrante, however, is not in point

either on the law or the facts.

In that case, the New York

Court held that the giving of a personal guarantee of a New
York business account by a foreign resident was not enough to
subject the foreign resident to New York jurisdiction where the
foreign resident had never set foot in New York.

The New York

long-arm statute requires at least one physical contact with
New York; thus the court in Ferrante held that ff'a single transaction in New York1 would be sufficient" (258 N.E.2d 202 at
204), but such transaction not having occurred, no jurisdiction
existed.

The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically held that

physical presence in Idaho is not necessary to doing business
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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under the Idaho long-arm statute.

Intermountain Business

Forms, Inc. v. Shepard Business Forms Co., 531 P.2d 1183,
96 Idaho 538 (1975).

Thus Ferrante is not applicable in

interpreting the Idaho long-arm statute.

In any case, defend-

ant-respondent Mecham admits at least one trip to Idaho in
connection with the business of Great Basin Grain Company.
Thus, it appears, in view of the language from Ferrante quoted
above, the New York Court would assert jurisdiction over
Mecham in the present case.
i

.

'

'

.

•

-

-

POINT II.
THE UTAH CASES ARE IN HARMONY WITH THE RULE THAT
PERSONAL GUARANTEE OF A COMMERCIAL ACCOUNT SUBMITS THE GUARANTOR TO JURISDICTION OF THE PLACE
WHERE THE ACCOUNT IS MAINTAINED.
The Utah courts have generally required more than
isolated physical contacts in order to constitute doing business
for purposes of long-arm jurisdiction.

The chief antecedent of

this jurisdictional attitude in Utah is the famous case of
Conn v. Whitmore, 9 U.2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959), interpreting
the pioneering Illinois long-arm statute.
In Conn, the Utah defendant had purchased horses in
Illinois by mail, sending the final installment on the price
with an agent who picked up the horses in Illinois.

The Utah

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Court refused to enforce an Illinois judgment where jurisdiction was based on such conduct.

Conn founded a line of Utah

cases in which the Court has ruled that transitory contact
with a state for purposes of completing a limited transaction
is not enough for jurisdiction.

Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's

Boats & Motors, Inc., 27 U.2d 233, 494 P.2d 532 (1972);
Pellegrini v. Sachs, 522 P.2d 704 (1974); Mack Financial Corp.
v. Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc., 529 P.2d 429 (1974).
On the other hand, the Utah Court has often been at .
pains to make clear that a foreign defendant who has taken
advantage of the benefits of the laws and economic climate of
Utah by such substantial purposeful activity, as to have maintained a real and continuous business presence here will be
subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts as to all causes
arising out of such business.

Hill v. Zale, 25 U.2d 357, 482

P.2d 332 (1971); Foreign Study League v. HoHand-America Line,
27 U.2d 442, 497 P.2d 244 (1972); Pellegrini, supra; Mack
Financial Corp., supra. Where defendant has engaged in such
systematic economic exploitation, it is not determinative that
the defendant has personally entered the state a bare minimum
of times.

The latter point is readily demonstrated by comparing

Conn with Foreign Study League, and Hill v. Zale, supra.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In Foreign Study League, it appeared that defendant,
a foreign cruise shipline not qualified in Utah, sold approximately $600,000.00 worth of services a year in Utah.

While de-

fendant had no regular employees in Utah, its services were
regularly offered through eighteen or nineteen independent
travel agents.

Defendant occasionally sent employees to Utah

to encourage the independent agents to sell defendant's
services.

Plaintiff was engaged in organizing study cruises,

and regularly arranged for such cruises on defendant's ships.
Defendant's officers occasionally appeared in Utah to discuss
that business with plaintiff.

Relying upon Hill v. Zale,

supra, the Court found that defendant was sufficiently present
in Utah to subject it to suit.
An interesting dissent by Justices Crockett and Ellett
in Foreign Study League points out that the physical contacts
with Utah of employees of defendant in that case were not substantially greater than those in Conn v. Whitmore.
In Hill v. Zale, supra, plaintiff sued a Texas corporation by serving an officer at one of defendant's Utah outlets.
The suit was for wages earned in Alaska.

Defendant alleged that

the Utah and Alaska stores were separately incorporated, and
that the parent, a separate Texas corporation, was not present
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in, and could not be sued in, Utah for any default of the
Alaska store.

The Court pointed out that the officers of

each separate Zale corporation were in all cases nearly identical, that the profits of each operation were funneled to the
parent corporation in Texas, and that the expenses of each
operation were paid in Texas.

The Court found that Zale-Texas

had "enjoy [ed] the advantages of having activities carried on
within [this] state to further its business interests under
the protection of its laws,11 and that "the defendant corporation has in a continuous and regular manner over a period of
years maintained such contacts and carried on such activities
within the state of Utah by the various means it employs that
it should be subject to the jurisdiction of its courts."
The comparison between Hill v. Zale, and Foreign Study
League on the one hand and Conn v. Whitmore on the other strongly suggests that where defendant has systematically exploited
the Utah economy by selling goods or services there and profiting thereby, jurisdiction will be found in Utah even though
defendant's physical contacts with the state have been minimal;
whereas, intermittent physical contact with the state in connection with the business out of which the claim arises probably will not be enough for jurisdiction unless it indicates or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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coincides with systematic economic exploitation.
Even admitting arguendo that defendant Mecham1s
physical contacts with Idaho in this case were few, a clearer
case than the present of systematic economic exploitation of
the Idaho legal and economic climate can hardly be imagined.
Mecham and company took advantage of the Idaho laws by incorporating an Idaho corporation to do business there.

They took

advantage of the economic climate of Idaho by endeavoring to
sell farm products to Idaho farmers through an on-the-spot
business manager with whom Mecham was in regular communication
for the purpose of running the business.

Mecham personally

guaranteed the commercial account of the corporation for the
purpose of inducing a course of business in Idaho.

When

Mechamfs Idaho concern defaulted on the credit Mecham had
personally induced Idaho citizens to extend to it, the victims
of such conduct ought to have had a remedy in Idaho.

That is

the force and effect of the rule established in the numerous
cases from other states cited above: Where, for the purpose
of inducing an ongoing course of commerce in a state, a
foreign resident personally guarantees the business account of
a local business to local citizens, and such course of commercial conduct ensues and results in injury, the foreigner ought
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to be subject to local jurisdiction in suits arising therefrom.
The Utah rule is entirely in accord:

Where a foreign resident

systematically exploits the economic and legal climate of Utah
by establishing an ongoing course of business here, he is
subject to Utah jurisdiction on complaints of Utah citizens
arising from such business, notwithstanding he may have been
physically present in the state a minimum of times.

POINT III.
NO HARDSHIP OR INJUSTICE WAS WORKED UPON
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT BY REQUIRING TRIAL IN
IDAHO.
Defendant-respondent alleged in the Third District
proceeding herein that it was unduly hard and unjust to require
him to face trial in this matter in Idaho.

This seems a pe-

culiar allegation from a man who incorporates businesses in
Idaho and takes an active part in their management.

Defendant-

respondent alleged that it would have been easier and more just
for a "giant" like Chevron to forego its right to sue in Idaho
where the default occurred and instead pursue Mecham in Utah.
The inconvenience of the Idaho forum is demonstrated, defendantrespondent alleged, by the fact that no Idaho residents testified at the trial.
'••'.••
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No Idaho residents testified because Heileson, the
Idaho manager of Great Basin Grain Company and the chief witness in the trial, had moved out of the state by the time the
trial began.
The claim that suit would have been more convenient
in Utah simply ignores the fact that such a course would require, at best, two actions -- one against Heileson in Idaho
and one against Mecham in Utah -- and might foreclose any action.
The obligation of Mecham and Heileson on the guarantee was
joint.

The evidence indicates that Heileson had not entered

Utah on any business of Great Basin Grain Company.
was an Idaho resident.

Heileson

. .-•

It is instantly apparent that Heileson

could not be sued in Utah.

If Mecham was to be sued in Utah,

Heileson would have to be sued separately in Idaho.

Insofar,

however, as the obligation was joint, each defendant in each
separate action could claim that the other was an indispensable party who could not be joined.

Separate actions could

result in inconsistent liabilities on the same obligation.

It

is not farfetched to assert that both Utah and Idaho courts
might have dismissed such separate actions for failure to join
the joint obligors.
Defendant-respondent simply ignores these difficulties
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of separate actions for plaintiff-appellant, and purports to
find a balance of equities in relieving defendant-respondent
from having to answer for his defaults where committed.

Cer-

tainly the balance of equities -- and perhaps the balance of
outright necessities -- required trial of this action in
Idaho.
POINT IV.
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S COLLATERAL OBLIGATIONS
ARE NOT WELL TAKEN.
Defendant-respondent argued at the hearing before
Judge Sawaya that plaintiff-appellant's judgment was unenforceable insofar as it was partially based upon Count II of the
Third Amended Complaint in the Idaho proceeding, relating to
secured debt owed by defendant-respondent to Bank of Salt Lake
and assigned to plaintiff-appellant.

Defendant argued that any

judgment based on Count II was invalid because defendant-respondent was not personally served with the Third Amended Complaint.
This argument is incorrect, as shown below.

In any case, the

judgment sought to be enforced herein was based entirely upon
the single count of the Complaint (Count I of subsequent
Amended Complaints), as shown by the Idaho judge's Supplemental
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As Findings 1 and 2 show, the basic amount owing to
plaintiff-appellant from Great Basin Grain Company on open
account (not on the loan from Bank of Salt Lake), was
$27,215.90.

This figure, less a finance charge not owing,

came to $23,343.48 (Finding 7).

Interest at the legal rate on

the account brought the figure to $30,966.69 (Conclusions 2,
6), from which were subtracted a set-off of $1,394.82 (Finding
10, Conclusions 3, 6 ) , a judgment for costs of $1,608.05 (Conclusions 4, 6 ) , and interest of $90.08 (Conclusion 6). Finally,
plaintiff-appellant!s costs of $261.50 were added (Conclusion
6) to obtain a figure of $28,055.39, for which figure judgment
was given.

This figure plainly represents an amount owing on

the account guaranteed by Mecham, as alleged in the single
count of the Complaint, together with interest and costs.

None

of the figure is attributable to Count II of the Third Amended
Complaint.
It is immaterial to enforcement of a judgment on the
single count of the Complaint whether Mecham was properly
served with subsequent Amended Complaints.
Defendant-respondent also alleges, however, that after
being personally served with the Complaint, he did not receive
any subsequent Amended Complaints.

These were served upon his
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attorney, who had appeared specially to contest jurisdiction
of the Complaint.

Defendant-respondent alleges that under the

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, all amended complaints adding
claims must be served upon the defendant directly, and cannot
be served upon defendant's attorney, and that a judgment on
such an amended complaint served on the attorney is void.
The applicable Idaho Rules are identical to the Utah Rules on
the subject.

Defendant-respondent is simply incorrect about

the effect of service on the attorney.
Rule 5(b), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
Whenever under these rules service is required or
permitted to be made upon a party represented by
an attorney the service shall be made upon the
attorney unless service upon the party himself
is ordered by the court.
All amended complaints must be served, of course.

Rule 5(a).

Thus, it is not only correct to serve the amended complaint
upon the attorney, it would be improper to serve the defendant
himself unless the court so ordered.
Defendant-respondent was apparently confused by Rule
5(a).

That enumerates the papers which must be served, con-

cluding:
... but no service need be made on parties in
default for failure to appear except that pleadings
asserting new or additional claims for relief
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against them shall be served upon them in the
manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4.
New or additional claims must be served directly upon parties
in default who have not appeared.
to the Utah Rule —

This provision -- identical

was never applicable in this case, since

Mecham had appeared and was not in default at the time the
Amended Complaints were served upon his attorney.

It would

appear that under Rule 5(a) a default judgment based upon an
amended complaint not served directly upon the defendant would
be of questionable validity.

There is no claim in the present

case however that the judgment sought to be enforced was obtained by default.

CONCLUSION
Defendant-respondent Mecham, with others, incorporated
a business, Great Basin Grain Company, in Idaho for profit,
traveled to Idaho at lease once on the business of Great Basin
Grain Company, engaged in the management of the Company by longdistance communication through an on-the spot business manager,
over a period of two years, and gave his personal guarantee of
the commercial account of Great Basin Grain Company in order
to induce extension of credit to the Company in Idaho.

The

credit was extended, the Company failed, and Mecham now asserts
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that he is immune from suit on his guarantee in Idaho.
Judge Sawaya, applying a rigid arithmetical approach,
held that the number of Mecham's physical contacts with Idaho
did not add up to jurisdiction.

The ruling ignores the simple

-- in fact, undisputed -- facts that Mecham was doing business
through Great Basin Grain Company, the business was done in
Idaho, and the claim herein arises out of that business.
Craig W. Mecham extended his personal credit into Idaho for
commercial purposes -- inducing extension of commercial credit
in order to be able to carry on an Idaho business -- and extensive business was done there on that credit.

The account

established thereby has been defaulted upon.

It defies logic

or justice to bar Idaho citizens victimized by these practices
from suit in Idaho to recover the resulting damages.
The judgment of the Third District Court herein should
be reversed and summary judgment ordered for plaintiff-appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
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